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Executive Summary
This JRC technical report presents the results obtained by the My Email Communications Security
Assessment (MECSA) tool. MECSA is an online1 tool developed by the Joint Research Centre to
assess the security of email communications between email providers; Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
[18] (SMTP) servers.
Email communications continue to be one of the most widespread forms of digital communications with
thousands of millions of emails exchanged on a daily basis. It is estimated that 72% of the European pop-
ulation use email either in mobile phones, tablets or computers. It is the means of digital communication
used by most Europeans on a daily basis2.
The importance of the protection of these new forms of digital communications over Internet, including
email, has been further highlighted in the latest policy initiatives of the Commission [31, 30]. Moreover,
when personal data is exchanged over email, the General Data Protection Regulation [32] requires that
appropriate technical and organisational measures are put in place to ensure the confidentiality and
integrity of the relevant processing systems and services.
MECSA is the outcome of our research on the security of email communications. It servers a triple
purpose. Firstly, it allows us to monitor the adoption of modern email security standards in the cur-
rent ecosystem of email providers, assessing their capability to protect the confidentiality, integrity and
authenticity of the email exchange amongst them. Secondly, MECSA aims to become a one-stop shop
for email users to receive an indication of the capability of their email providers to protect their email
exchange in the communication with other providers of the ecosystem. Finally, MECSA aims to become
a reference tool for professionals and a mean to promote the adoption of modern email security standards
in Europe.
In 2018, MECSA carried out over 15.000 assessments, analysing a total of 48363 unique email providers.
In this report, we present the methodology followed, statistics about the results obtained and a set of
highlights and recommendations based on the research carried out on this topic.
The main highlights of this report are the following ones:
There are important gaps in the adoption of modern email communications security stan-
dards.
Only 25.66% of the email providers analysed by MECSA were found to have properly adopted the
minimum set of modern email security standards recommended to ensure the confidentiality, integrity
and authenticity of the communications. Out of this 25.66%, only 19.02% adopted all recommended
email security standards.
26.72% of email providers did not adopt any email security standard to fight email spoofing and iden-
tity theft. Moreover, 12.30% of email providers did not employ any security standard to protect the
confidentiality of the email exchange between email providers.
Furthermore, we found that in many cases email providers attempted to adopt security standards but
failed to deploy them correctly. In particular, more than 18.87% of the email providers analysed failed
to deploy properly standards related to protecting the confidentiality. That figure raised to 32.32% for
those standards related to the fight against email spoofing and identity theft.
1https://mecsa.jrc.ec.europa.eu
2Special Eurobarometer 462, 2017. Published July 2018.
3MECSA stats last checked 20/12/2018
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There is a lack of incentives to adopt modern email security standards.
The adoption of email security standards is not mandatory. Email providers can achieve a degree of
interoperability good enough to exchange emails with other providers, without supporting any security
protocol. In this scenario, emails will be sent and received in plaintext (without encryption) and there
will be no mechanisms to protect the integrity of emails or fight email identity theft. These email
communications between email providers take place in a completely transparent way for end-users.
Unlike web users, who can rely on the padlock icon of the browser, email users lack indicators of the
capability of email providers to protect their digital communications. Our experience with MECSA
indicates that most users were unaware of the actual capability of their email provider to protect their
email exchange.
As a result of this, there is currently a lack of incentives for email providers to adopt modern email
security standards. This lack of incentives propagate along the supply chain. There is not always a big
enough demand for email server software/appliance vendors to support these standards. As a result,
many well-known email products (usually appliances and proprietary software) lack support for some of
them.
The recommendations put forward in this report are the following ones:
Recommendation of a minimum set of email security standards to be adopted by service
providers and development of technical guidelines.
A European recommendation on a set of modern email security standards to be supported by email
providers would help to close existing gaps in their adoption. Public procurement of email server soft-
ware/hardware products could refer to this recommendation when setting the mandatory functionalities
and security requirements.
The development of technical guidelines and good practices for the deployment of email security standards
would help to avoid common mistakes like missing certificate chains or syntax errors in the policies. This
could be of particular importance in the case of SMEs that might lack the resources required to carry
out the deployment of these standards.
Support on-going efforts to promote modern email security standards and incentivise their
adoption.
The several on-going efforts to promote modern email security standards in Member States should be
promoted. In this regards, we consider that MECSA is a valuable tool to contribute and complement
these efforts.
Moreover, strategies to incentivise the adoption of email security standards should be considered. For
example, the application of a security seal backed up by the objective assessment of the email security
standards properly adopted by a given email provider, would help to boost end-user’s trust and provide
an incentive for manufacturers and service providers.
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1 Introduction
With thousands of millions of emails exchanged on a daily basis, email is one of the most widespread
forms of digital communications. In the current era of the digital society, email communications are
massively used, not only to support inter-personal communications among citizens but also as a more
traditional communication channel to complement the current ecosystem of online services, as shown in
Figure 1 from the latest report on E-Communications and Digital Single Market [4] where 72% of the
surveyed EU citizens answered they use email services.
Email is often used to transmit personal data, not only in citizen’s personal communications, but also
when used in e-government services or e-Health. Moreover, email addresses are massively used in the
management of online digital identities, being email communications an integral part of online authen-
tication systems (e.g. when used in a password recovery process). Effective mitigation of security and
privacy risks in email communications is of paramount importance given the role that they play in the
current digital society.
The importance of the protection of digital communications has been further highlighted in the latest
policy initiatives [31, 30], where email communications are identified as one of the Over-The-Top services
whose confidentiality shall be protected. In their recitals, the ePrivacy proposed regulation [31] highlight
the importance of protecting the confidentiality of electronic communications following the fundamental
right to privacy enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [28].
Moreover, when personal data is exchanged over email, the General Data Protection Regulation EU
2016/679 [32] (GDPR) requires in its article 32 that appropriate technical and organizational measures
shall be put in place to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the relevant processing systems and
services. Further, article 5 of the GDPR states than an appropriate level of the protection of the security
(integrity and confidentiality) is a prerequisite for the processing of personal data.
This report presents the results of the MECSA project. MECSA is an online1 tool developed by the
Joint Research Centre to assess the security of email communications between email providers. MECSA
1https://mecsa.jrc.ec.europa.eu
Figure 1: Experience using different communication services. Source: Special Eurobarometer 462
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was launched to survey the security of email communications between providers.
The development of the MECSA platform has 3 main objectives. Its first objective is to provide us
with a general overview on the state of security of email communications between providers. Its second
objective focuses on the non-technical users of email, for whom MECSA aims to be a point of reference
to raise awareness on the importance of email security, and offer them a one-stop shop where they can
check the security offered by their email providers. Its third objective targets technical users, including
administrators of email services, offering them a comprehensive report with details on which security
measures their email provider supports and which ones it does not support.
The results presented in this report are the continuation of a previous work developed in the JRC by
Sanchez et al. [16] and Malatras et al. [22] where we analyzed the vulnerabilities of the modern email
services, and we reviewed the existing security standards in order identify which ones could be used to
mitigate the vulnerabilities detected.
Previous work in this area is limited. Durumeric et al. [9] presented an empirical analysis of StartTLS,
Sender Policy Framework [17, 19] (SPF), Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Con-
formance [20] (DMARC) and DomainKeys Identified Mail [7] (DKIM) using a dataset from Google logs
and the Alexa list of top 1M ranked websites. Even though in their paper they also present a study on
Domain Name System (DNS) Hijacking, they do not mention neither DANE nor Domain Name System
Security Extensions [2, 13, 34] (DNSSEC), a standard that would help to prevent such attacks.
Comparing with their results on the Google dataset, it seems that StartTLS support has improved. They
reported that 58% of domains support StartTLS on all their communications with Google, which is 11%
less than our results where all MTAs have StartTLS support with valid x509 certificates. This value is
also similar in the tests on the Top 1M Alexa, where 82% of domains support StartTLS (87% in the
MECSA results), but the percentage of domains with StartTLS properly configured increased from the
35% reported in Durumeric et al. [9] to a 69% in the MECSA assessments. The results for SPF, DKIM
and DMARC based on the Google dataset are presented as % of emails sent/received, which we cannot
compare with our results, presented as % of domains. But for the Top 1M Alexa websites, Durumeric
et al. [9] report 47% of support for SPF and only 1.1% for DMARC. In these two standards our results
present a notable increase, from 47% to 63% in SPF support, and from 1.1% to 44% in DMARC support.
Chung et al. [3] presented a comprehensive study on the deployment of DNSSEC. According to their
best estimates, only 1% of domains supported DNSSEC in 2017. In our assessment we found that 10%
of domains have DNSSEC enabled, and almost all of them, 9%, have their email service protected with
DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities [14, 11, 8] (DANE).
The rest of the report is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe the email ecosystem, we
highlight its main vulnerabilities and we present a list of modern email security standards that can be
used to mitigate these vulnerabilities. In Section 3 we introduce the methodology used by the MECSA
platform to assess the security of email communications. The results obtained during the 2018 campaign
are presented in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we present our conclusions and recommendations.
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2 Security in Email Communications: history, evolution
and challenges
From an architectural point of view (see Figure 2), Modern email does not differ that much from tra-
ditional mail (post mail). In modern email, we have email users and email servers, whereas in the post
mail we have mail users and post offices. Moreover, the process flow to deliver messages is basically the
same. In the modern email, the messages sent go to the email server of the sender, from the sender’s
email server to the recipient’s email server (provider-to-provider email communications), and finally to
the recipient’s inbox. On the other hand, in the post mail, the letters sent go to the sender’s post office,
from the sender’s post office to the recipient’s post office, and finally to the recipient’s mailbox. Email
services are built over a set of three well know standards: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol [18] (SMTP),
Post Office Protocol - Version 3 [26] (POP3) and Internet Message Access Protocol [6] (IMAP). These
standards were originally designed under the assumption that its users and the communications channels
used were trusted. In reality, none of these assumptions holds true. Rogue Email Servers are usually
behind spam and/or phishing campaigns, where they deliver millions of emails spoofing the identity of
the sender. Furthermore, a malicious user can easily hijack the communication channel to redirect traffic,
to block it, or to read everything sent and received, without leaving any trace. Since Mail Servers and
communication channels were considered trusted, in the initial design of the core protocols that support
email services (SMTP, POP3, IMAP), no previsions were made to protect the messages or to validate
the identity of senders and recipients.
2.1 Email vulnerabilities
The original development of the core email protocols and the lack of adoption of new standards developed
to secure email communications renders email communications vulnerable to various malicious attacks.
Figure 3 represent different types of attacks that can target email communications. We have analysed
the vulnerabilities of email communications and we have classified them in three groups, depending of the
properties affected: confidentiality (Section 2.1.1), identity (Section 2.1.2) and integrity (Section 2.1.3).
Figure 2: Email Architecture
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2.1.1 Confidentiality
Without a secure communication channel, a malicious user could eavesdrop the communications between
email servers. There are different ways in which an attacker could achieve this objective, such as passively
monitoring data as it flows through intermediate routers or communication links, or performing a Man-In-
The-Middle (MITM) attack at network level to change the flow of communications to his/her advantage
and be able to monitor the communication. An example of this scenario would be the abuse of the
Border Gateway Protocol [21] (BGP) to change the routing of IP packets effectively creating a network
level MITM attack [27]. Such an attack vector is also known as BGP hijacking.
2.1.2 Identity
The protocol implicitly trusts the identity of the senders, assuming that all emails received are legitimate.
This lack of authentication can be abused in order to spoof email identities, i.e. send emails pretending
to be someone else. In order to carry out this attack, the malicious sender does not require tampering
with the network communications of a legitimate server, which simplifies its execution.
Phishing is one of the malicious techniques that can take advantage of spoofed identities to carry out
attacks, e.g. posing as the IT department of a bank, social network, online retailer, etc. and requesting
the victim to log in to his account using a link provided in the email.
2.1.3 Integrity
Another consequence of not having a secure communication channel is the lack of integrity protection;
we do not have the means to assure that the message received is the same one that was sent. An attacker
has several options to execute this type of attack. One of them is to manipulate the email while it
is in transit. In this case, the attack would leave almost no trace at SMTP level, therefore making it
impossible to detect at the user side. Going a step further, an attacker could manipulate the traffic to
receive the outbound connection of the sender Mail Transfer Agent (MTA), impersonating the identity
of the legitimate recipient’s MTA. The attacker can employ several means to achieve that, such as
mounting a network-based attack. One effective way to perform such an attack would be the abuse of
Figure 3: Email Communications Vulnerabilities
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the DNS protocol [26].
A typical abuse of this vulnerability would be adding malicious content to emails (infected files), with
the objective to spread a virus infection.
2.2 Modern security protocols
Since the initial development of the core email protocols (SMTP, POP3 and IMAP), different proposals
for new protocols and/or extensions of previous ones have appeared to address email vulnerabilities
(section 2.1). In a previous work developed at the JRC E.3 unit [16, 22], we have identified a set of
modern security protocols that can help to mitigate the vulnerabilities of email services presented in the
previous Section.
StartTLS [12, 25] is an extension of the SMTP protocol that allows the use of TLS in communications
between SMTP clients and servers. Using StartTLS, client and server can create an encrypted channel
to exchange SMTP messages, effectively protecting the communication from eavesdroppers. StartTLS is
an efficient measure to mitigate the attacks on confidentiality of communications between MTAs.
An x509 [1, 33, 5, 35] certificate is a standard description of public key certificates. The format of the
certificate is established in the RFC 5280 [5], the ways to access it and to process it are defined in the
RFC 4210 [1], and the RFC 3739 [33] defines what it calls a “Qualified Certificate” which is related to
the European Directive on Electronic Signature (Directive 1999/93/EC [29]). An x509 certificate can be
used for the following two main purposes.
• To verify the identity of the subject (e.g. a website) that owns the certificate, in such a way that
you can be sure that the subject is really who it says to be. The URL of the website must match
either the Common Name (CN) value in the Subject field, or the Subject Alternative Names (SAN).
• To send encrypted data that only the owner of the certificate will be able to decrypt (and read).
In the context of SMTP communications, x509 certificates are used to validate the identity of SMTP
servers, during the TLS negotiation. Optionally, it can also be used to validate the identity of the client.
The use of certificates increases the trust in SMTP communications, the client can validate the identity
of the server. The proper use of x509 certificates is an effective measure to protect the confidentiality
of the communications, and to some extent the integrity (when communicating directly from sender to
recipient).
Sender Policy Framework [17, 19] (SPF) is a protocol that allows email providers to announce a
list of hosts authorized to deliver emails on its behalf. SPF records are published as TXT type records
in the DNS of the email provider.
The SPF protocol is an effective measure to avoid the delivery of messages from illegitimate sources,
fighting against phishing and identity theft. It helps recipients to identify messages sent from rogue hosts
or networks. The application of the SPF protocol is an effective measure to mitigate the risk of identity
spoofing (phishing and identity theft).
DomainKeys Identified Mail [7] (DKIM) is a standard that allows a recipient to validate the origin
and contents of an email. It uses digital signatures to bind an email message with its origin. An email
provider supporting DKIM has one or more private keys, and their associated public keys published as
DNS records with the url <selector>. domainkey.<domain>.
The application of DKIM ensures recipients that the messages received have not been manipulated,
Page 11 of 30
therefore it is an effective measure to mitigate the attacks against the integrity of messages.
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance [20] (DMARC) is a
mechanism by which an email provider can publish policies regarding SPF and DKIM : how to perform
validation, what to do if validation fails (reject, quarantine, none), and how to report. It can also be
used to define a policy of accepting/rejecting certain percentage of failed messages, allowing a gradual
deployment of SPF and/or DKIM .
DMARC , along with SPF and/or DKIM , is an effective measure to fight against identity spoofing and
message tampering.
Domain Name System Security Extensions [2, 13, 34] (DNSSEC) is a protocol used to au-
thenticate the response messages of DNS servers. This mechanism is useful to prevent applications from
using altered or forged DNS records. The protocol is able to authenticate a set of DNS records through
the verification of a cryptographic signature associated.
The use of DNSSEC assures that DNS records are valid and have not been modified or tampered with,
increasing the level of trust. DNSSEC can have a positive impact in all three scenarios described in
Section 2.1.
DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities [14, 11, 8] (DANE) is a mechanism that binds
x509 certificates (or public keys) to domain names. In combination with DNSSEC , it allows a service
to generate its own certificates, without requiring the services of a trusted CA.
The use of DANE increases the level of trust as well as the security and privacy of the communications.
Along with DNSSEC , it can be used to mitigate the attacks on confidentiality.
Emerging standards. Apart from the well-known existing standards, at the time this report has been
written, the Using TLS in Applications (UTA) [15] Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) is working on other drafts that will have a positive impact on the increase of security of
email communications.
SMTP Strict Transport Security [24] (MTA-STS) is a mechanism to publish policy directives regarding
the use of TLS connections and x509 certificate validation. It is developed as an alternative to the
use of DANE + DNSSEC . MTA-STS will be an efficient measure to mitigate the attacks against the
confidentiality of communications between MTAs.
SMTP TLS Reporting [23] describes a mechanism to report statistics and information related to the
establishment of TLS communications between SMTP servers. This information can be helpful to deploy
technologies like MTA-STS, as well as to detect problems caused by configuration errors, attacks, etc. It
can be an efficient measure to mitigate the attacks against the confidentiality of communications between
MTAs.
RequireTLS [10] is an SMTP service extension that allows SMTP clients to specify either if they want
their emails to be delivered using TLS, all the way from the sender MTA to the final recipient MTA , or
if they want to prioritize delivery, overriding protocols like DANE or MTA-STS if necessary.
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3 Methodology
To evaluate the security of email communications between providers we have developed a set of non-
intrusive tests, and we have integrated them into an online platform: My Email Communications Security
Assessment1 (MECSA) platform.
MECSA is a public service where users can request an assessment of their email provider. After sub-
mitting their email address, they will receive an email sent by the MECSA platform. To initiate the
assessment, they have to reply to this email. Following a privacy by design approach, the email address
received will be deleted from our database as soon as the assessment has finished, or after 24h without
receiving a reply to the email sent.
The process to test an email provider is very simple. It only requires three steps:
1. The user submits his email address to the MECSA platform.
2. MECSA sends an email to the address submitted, requesting a reply to initiate the process. The
user has to reply to start the assessment. If the user does not reply, the email address will be
deleted from the MECSA database after 24h.
3. When MECSA receives the reply, it will initiate the assessment. Once it is finished, MECSA will
send an email to the user with the report identifier, and it will delete the message received and the
email address of the user.
This interaction with the user allows the MECSA platform to tests the security of email communications
in both directions, i.e. given an email address, it analyses the security measures applied by the email
provider when it receives emails (inbound), and when it delivers them (outbound). Moreover, it prevents
abuse of the platform, requiring users to have a valid email account in the domain for which they request
an assessment.
MECSA will check if the email security standards described in Section 2.2 are applied (StartTLS, x509,
SPF, DKIM, DMARC, DANE and DNSSEC).
StartTLS is tested for each Mail Exchanger (MX) in the inbound (email reception) and for each email
server in outbound (email delivery) directions. To evaluate the application of the x509 standards we
follow a strict approach. We execute four different tests:
• Does a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) sign the certificate?
• Does the certificate validate the hostname we are connecting to (Full Qualified Domain Name,
FQDN)?
• Is the certificate expired?
• Is the certificate revoked (we check the Revocation List, RCL)?
The assessment for the SPF standard has three steps. First, we check if there is a DNS SPF registry.
Second, we use a python library (pyspf) to check the syntax of the SPF registry. Finally, we use the IP
address of the sender, its hostname and the domain name of the email address to evaluate the compliance
with the SPF record (pyspf). DKIM is evaluated by a python library (dkimpy), using the reply email
received. The test on the application of DMARC checks for the existence of a DMARC record, and it
does a syntax check on the record found (if any). DANE is validated per email server. It applies to the
incoming servers of email providers, and we test it independently of the results on the DNSSEC test.
The DNSSEC executed by the MECSA platform requires answering the following questions.
• Is the email domain protected by DNSSEC?
1https://mecsa.jrc.ec.europa.eu
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Score StartTLS x509 SPF DKIM DMARC DANE DNSSEC
X - - - - X X
X X - - - 7 X
X X - - - X 7
X X - - - 7 7
X 7 - - - X 7
X 7 - - - 7 X
X 7 - - - 7 7
7 - - - - - -
Table 3.1: Definition of Confidentiality Scores
• Are the TXT records of the email domain protected by DNSSEC?
• Are the Mail Exchange (MX) records of the email domain protected by DNSSEC?
• For each MX, is the MX domain protected by DNSSEC?
• Are the TXT records of the MX domain protected by DNSSEC?
• Are the TLSA records of the MX domain protected by DNSSEC?
The results of all tests are combined in a summary report, where we provide score in three different
domains: confidential delivery (confidentiality), phishing and identity theft (identity) and integrity of
messages (integrity):
• Confidential Delivery : This parameter focuses on the privacy of communications between MTAs.
It measures the ability of establishing secure communication channels when receiving or delivering
messages. It is related to the confidentiality attacks described in Section 2.1.1. In Table 3.1 we
can see the correspondence between protocols supported and score obtained.
• Phishing and Identity Theft : This parameter focus on two aspects related to the authorship of email
messages. On one hand, it measures the ability of identifying messages sent from unauthorized
sources. On the other hand, it measures the ability of protecting its users from identity theft. It is
related to the identity attacks described in Section 2.1.2. The correspondence between protocols
supported and score obtained can be seen in Table 3.2.
• Integrity of Messages: This parameter focuses on the detection of modifications suffered by email
messages when traveling from MTA to MTA. It is related to the integrity attacks described in
Section 2.1.3. In Table 3.3 we can see the correspondence between the protocols supported and
the score assigned.
In addition to the summary report, MECSA provides and advanced report that can be used by profes-
sional users (including email administrators) to learn more details on the results obtained.
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Score StartTLS x509 SPF DKIM DMARC DANE DNSSEC
- - X X X - X
- - X X X - 7
- - X X 7 - X
- - X 7 X - X
- - 7 X X - X
- - X 7 X - 7
- - 7 X X - 7
- - X X 7 - 7
- - 7 X 7 - X
- - X 7 7 - X
- - X 7 7 - 7
- - 7 X 7 - X
- - 7 X 7 - 7
- - 7 7 X - -
- - 7 7 7 - -
Table 3.2: Definition of Phishing and Identity Theft Scores
Score StartTLS x509 SPF DKIM DMARC DANE DNSSEC
- - - X X - X
X X - X X - 7
X X - X 7 - X
7 - - X X - 7
7 - - X 7 - X
X - - X 7 - 7
X 7 - X 7 - X
X 7 - X X - 7
X X - 7 X - X
7 - - X 7 - 7
X X - 7 X - 7
7 - - 7 X - -
X X - 7 7 - -
X 7 - 7 7 - -
7 - - 7 7 - -
Table 3.3: Definition of Integrity Scores
Page 15 of 30
Page 16 of 30
4 Results Obtained
As of today (December 2018), the MECSA platform has generated more than 14600 reports, from more
than 4600 different email providers. Figure 4 summarizes these results on the three categories evaluated:
confidentiality, identity and integrity. Only 25.66% of the domains analysed by MECSA support a
minimum set of the recommended email security standards, i.e. they scored at least 3.5 stars in each of
the three categories evaluated. Out of this 25.66%, only 19.02% adopted all of them.
Definitions and assumptions:
• Email Provider: An email provider is an entity responsible of providing email services to an end
user, independently of the infrastructure it uses. In practice, it is the domain name of the email
address.
• MECSA will assess a protocol as supported when it succeeds in, at least, 80% of the tests. As
example, a provider with 2 MX servers that support StartTLS and 1 outbound server that sends
emails in plain-text would succeed in of 66.6% of the StartTLS tests (not supported), therefore it
would receive a score of 0 stars, according to table 3.1
• The categories are obtained querying the Fortiguard1 web filter service, sending the domain name
of the email provider.
Confidential Delivery
The results obtained with the MECSA platform show that 69% of the email providers tested do protect
the confidentiality of the emails they send and receive (their user’s email communications). Another
18.87% of email providers offer a minimum level of protection of the confidentiality of email communi-
cations, most of them failing to have either a valid certificate or a consistent support for the StartTLS
standard (e.g. having support for sending emails but not for receiving them, or vice versa). The results
presented in Figure 4 show that more than 12% of email providers do not protect the confidentiality of
their user’s email communications.
1https://fortiguard.com/webfilter
Figure 4: Overall Results from the MECSA platform
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Figure 5: Overall Results from the MECSA platform by Protocol
Phishing and Identity Theft
Phishing and identity theft is the category with a lower percentage of protection, only 40.96% of the
email providers would offer protection against it. In this case, the amount of providers with minimum
level of protection, i.e. partially supporting the protocols needed (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, DNSSEC) or
supporting them with errors is 33.32%. More than one fourth of email providers, 26.72%, do not support
any of the standards related to the protection against phishing and identity theft.
Integrity of Messages
Regarding the protecting the integrity of email communications, the results in Figure 4 show that 43.58%
of email providers protect it. Although the percentage is slightly larger that the percentage for protection
against phishing and identity theft, the number of providers with minimum support (i.e. support with
errors) is much more lower, only 4%. More than 50% of domains do not protect the integrity of their
user’s email communications, mainly because the standards used to evaluate (positively) this domain,
DANE and DNSSEC, are the ones with less support, as we can see in Figure 5.
Figure 5 presents the percentages of support, by protocol. StartTLS is the standard most supported, 87%
of the email providers have StartTLS enabled in at least 80% of their communications. But only 70%
use a valid certificate. The most common errors we found are the usage of self-signed certificates, failing
to provide the full chain of certificates to the root Certification Authority (CA), and having certificates
that do not match the Full Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of the corresponding MX.
SPF is supported by 63% of the email providers tested, and there is another 4% that publish an SPF
DNS record, but with syntax errors. Among the syntax errors detected there are two that account for
most of them: ’Void lookup limit of 2 exceeded’ and ’Too many DNS lookups’. The first one occurs when
an SPF record includes references to more than 2 URLs without DNS resolution, whereas the latest
occurs when an SPF record includes too many external references. DKIM is supported by less than half
of the email providers tested, 44%. DMARC is supported by 23% of the providers tested. DMARC is
meant to be deployed along SPF and/or DKIM. In our results, the optimal situation (i.e. SPF and
DKIM) occurs in about 78% of the providers with DMARC support, the worse case, DMARC alone,
appears in only 2% of the tests.
Only 9% of the email providers tested have DANE enabled, making it the standard with lowest support.
But in this case we did not detect any configuration/deployment errors, all domains with TLSA records
were validated correctly. Support for DNSSEC is similar than DANE, only 10% of the email providers
tested were protected by DNSSEC.
Figure 6 presents the results as percentages of each domain protected, by category. As previously
mentioned, to obtain the category of the URL, we used the Fortiguard2 web filter application. In the
2https://fortiguard.com/webfilter
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Table 4.1: default
Category Domains Category Domains
Newly Observed Domain 1315 News and Media 42
Business 1058 General Organizations 31
Information Technology 646 Shopping 30
Education 347 Sports 26
Government and Legal Organizations 248 Web Hosting 23
Search Engines and Portals 133 Political Organizations 21
Web-based Email 95 Meaningless Content 19
Not Rated 80 Society and Lifestyles 17
Health and Wellness 69 Games 16
Personal Websites and Blogs 65 Arts and Culture 14
Reference 65 Global Religion 13
Finance and Banking 63 Personal Vehicles 11
Travel 62 Newsgroups and Message Boards 10
Entertainment 47
Table 4.2: Number of domains in each category, for categories with more than 10 domains
results presented, we have eliminated from the list those domains with less than 10 samples. In Table 4.2
we have all the categories ordered by the number of domains per category. The top category is Newly
Observed Domain, which means a domain recently configured or activated, followed by the business
category.
In only 2 categories all the email providers protect their user’s email communications in the three domains
assessed (confidentiality, phishing and identity theft and integrity), ’Society and Lifestyles’ and ’Games’.
Surprisingly, one of the most common categories, ’Business’, does not support measures to protect the
identity of its users nor the integrity of the messages sent and/or received by their users. Moreover, its
average score in confidentiality is one of the worst.
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Figure 6: MECSA Results by Category
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5 Conclusions
This report presented the results of the MECSA project, a tool created to evaluate the level of adoption
of relevant security standards in email communications between providers. It evaluates a given email
provider on the basis of the security standards that it supports. In particular, MECSA checks the support
of StartTLS and validation of x509 certificates, SPF, DKIM, DMARC, DANE and DNSSEC.
The results obtained reveal serious gaps in the adoption of these standards. In terms of confidentiality,
more than 12% of email providers fail to encrypt communications with other providers, and ca. 19% follow
an opportunistic encryption approach by not using valid x509 certificates. Furthermore, the adoption
of DNSSEC and DANE standards falls below 10%. Standards designed to protect against phishing and
identity theft received a fair degree of adoption with over 63% of domains supporting SPF, although its
combination with DMARC falls to slightly more than 22%. Regarding the integrity of messages, DKIM
is supported only by 44% of the providers tested, and its combination with DMARC falls to less than
20%.
In the light of the data presented in this report, we recommend to study the following actions.
Recommendation of a minimum set of email security standards to be adopted by service
providers and development of technical guidelines.
The adoption of email security standards is not mandatory. Email providers can achieve a degree of
interoperability good enough to exchange emails with other providers, without supporting any security
protocol. In this scenario, emails will be sent and received in plaintext (without encryption) and there
will be no mechanisms to protect the integrity of emails or fight email identity theft. These email
communications between email providers take place in a completely transparent way for end-users.
Unlike web users, who can rely on the padlock icon of the browser, email users lack indicators of the
capability of email providers to protect their digital communications. Our experience with MECSA
indicates that most users were unaware of the actual capability of their email provider to protect their
email exchange.
As a result of this, there is a current lack of incentives for email providers to adopt modern email security
standards. This lack of incentives propagate along the supply chain. There is not always a big enough
demand for email server software/appliance vendors to support these standards. As a result, many
well-known email products (usually appliances and proprietary software) lack support for some of them.
A European recommendation on a set of modern email security standards to be supported by email
providers would help to close existing gaps in their adoption. Public procurement of email server soft-
ware/hardware products could refer to this recommendation when setting the mandatory functionalities
and security requirements.
We found that in many cases email providers attempted to adopt security standards but failed to deploy
them correctly. In particular, more than 18.87% of the email providers analysed failed to deploy properly
standards related to protecting the confidentiality. That figure raised to 32.32% for in deployment of
those standards related to the fight against email spoofing and identity theft.
The development of technical guidelines and good practices for the deployment of email security stan-
dards would help to avoid common mistakes like missing certificate chains or syntax errors in the policies.
This could be of particular importance in the case of SMEs that might lack the resources required to
carry out the deployment of these standards.
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Support on-going efforts to promote modern email security standards and incentivise their
adoption.
Only 25.66% of the email providers analysed by MECSA were found to have properly adopted the
minimum set of modern email security standards recommended to ensure the confidentiality, integrity
and authenticity of the communications. Out of this 25.66%, only 19.02% adopted all recommended
email security standards.
26.72% of email providers did not adopt any email security standard to fight email spoofing and iden-
tity theft. Moreover, 12.30% of email providers did not employ any security standard to protect the
confidentiality of the email exchange between email providers.
The several on-going efforts to promote modern email security standards in Member States should be
promoted. In this regards, we consider that MECSA is a valuable tool to contribute and complement
these efforts.
Moreover, strategies to incentivise the adoption of email security standards should be considered. For
example, the application of a security seal backed up by the objective assessment of the email security
standards properly adopted by a given email provider, would help to boost end-user’s trust and provide
an incentive for manufacturers and service providers.
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Acronyms
BGP Border Gateway Protocol [21] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
CA Certification Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
DANE DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities [14, 11, 8]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
DKIM DomainKeys Identified Mail [7] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
DMARC Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance [20] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
DNS Domain Name System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
DNSSEC Domain Name System Security Extensions [2, 13, 34] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
FQDN Full Qualified Domain Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation EU 2016/679 [32] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
IMAP Internet Message Access Protocol [6] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
MECSA My Email Communications Security Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
MITM Man-In-The-Middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
MTA Mail Transfer Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
MTA-STS SMTP Strict Transport Security [24] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
MX Mail Exchanger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
POP3 Post Office Protocol - Version 3 [26] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol [18] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SPF Sender Policy Framework [17, 19] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Page 23 of 30
Page 24 of 30
Bibliography
[1] C. Adams, S. Farrell, T. Kause, and T. Mononen. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certifi-
cate Management Protocol (CMP). RFC 4210 (Proposed Standard), September 2005. Updated by
RFC 6712.
[2] R. Arends, R. Austein, M. Larson, D. Massey, and S. Rose. DNS Security Introduction and Re-
quirements. RFC 4033 (Proposed Standard), March 2005. Updated by RFCs 6014, 6840.
[3] Taejoong Chung, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran, David Choffnes, Dave
Levin, Bruce M. Maggs, Alan Mislove, and Christo Wilson. A longitudinal, end-to-end view of the
DNSSEC ecosystem. In 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17), pages 1307–1322,
Vancouver, BC, 2017. USENIX Association.
[4] European Commission. Special eurobarometer 462. e-communications and digital single market.
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/
getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/surveyKy/2155.
[5] D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, and W. Polk. Internet X.509 Public
Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. RFC 5280 (Proposed
Standard), May 2008. Updated by RFC 6818.
[6] M. Crispin. INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION 4rev1. RFC 3501 (Pro-
posed Standard), March 2003. Updated by RFCs 4466, 4469, 4551, 5032, 5182, 5738, 6186, 6858,
7817.
[7] D. Crocker, T. Hansen, and M. Kucherawy. DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures. RFC
6376 (INTERNET STANDARD), September 2011.
[8] V. Dukhovni and W. Hardaker. The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Pro-
tocol: Updates and Operational Guidance. RFC 7671 (Proposed Standard), October 2015.
[9] Zakir Durumeric, David Adrian, Ariana Mirian, James Kasten, Elie Bursztein, Nicolas Lidzborski,
Kurt Thomas, Vijay Eranti, Michael Bailey, and J. Alex Halderman. Neither snow nor rain nor
mitm...: An empirical analysis of email delivery security. In Proceedings of the 2015 Internet Mea-
surement Conference, IMC ’15, pages 27–39, New York, NY, USA, 2015. ACM.
[10] Jim Fenton. SMTP Require TLS Option. Internet-Draft draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls-06, Internet
Engineering Task Force, December 2018. Work in Progress.
[11] O. Gudmundsson. Adding Acronyms to Simplify Conversations about DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE). RFC 7218 (Proposed Standard), April 2014.
[12] P. Hoffman. SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer Security. RFC 3207
(Proposed Standard), February 2002. Updated by RFC 7817.
[13] P. Hoffman. Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier Allocation for DNSSEC. RFC 6014 (Proposed
Standard), November 2010.
[14] P. Hoffman and J. Schlyter. The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport
Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA. RFC 6698 (Proposed Standard), August 2012. Updated by
RFCs 7218, 7671.
[15] Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Using tls in applications: Charter.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-uta/.
[16] Iwen Coisel Ignacio Sanchez, Apostolos Malatras. A security analysis of email communications. JRC
Technical Report JRC99372, European Comission.
Page 25 of 30
[17] S. Kitterman. Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for Authorizing Use of Domains in Email, Version
1. RFC 7208 (Proposed Standard), April 2014. Updated by RFC 7372.
[18] J. Klensin. Simple Mail Transfer Protocol. RFC 5321 (Draft Standard), October 2008. Updated by
RFC 7504.
[19] M. Kucherawy. Email Authentication Status Codes. RFC 7372 (Proposed Standard), September
2014.
[20] M. Kucherawy and E. Zwicky. Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
(DMARC). RFC 7489 (Informational), March 2015.
[21] K. Lougheed and Y. Rekhter. Border gateway protocol 3 (bgp-3). RFC 1267, RFC Editor, October
1991.
[22] A. Malatras, I. Coisel, and I. Sanchez. Technical recommendations for improving security of email
communications. In 39th International Convention on Information and Communication Technology,
Electronics and Microelectronics (MIPRO), pages 1381–1386. Croatian Society MIPRO, 2016.
[23] Daniel Margolis, Alexander Brotman, Binu Ramakrishnan, Janet Jones, and Mark Risher. SMTP
TLS Reporting. RFC 8460, September 2018.
[24] Daniel Margolis, Mark Risher, Binu Ramakrishnan, Alexander Brotman, and Janet Jones. SMTP
MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS). RFC 8461, September 2018.
[25] A. Melnikov. Updated Transport Layer Security (TLS) Server Identity Check Procedure for Email-
Related Protocols. RFC 7817 (Proposed Standard), March 2016.
[26] J. Myers and M. Rose. Post Office Protocol - Version 3. RFC 1939 (INTERNET STANDARD),
May 1996. Updated by RFCs 1957, 2449, 6186.
[27] Ola Nordstro¨m and Constantinos Dovrolis. Beware of bgp attacks. SIGCOMM Computer Commu-
nication Review, 34(2):1–8, 2004.
[28] Council of European Union. Charter of fundamental rights of the european union 2012/c 326/02.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:C2012/326/02.
[29] Council of European Union. Directive 1999/93/ec of the european parliament and of the council of
13 december 1999 on a community framework for electronic signatures.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:31999L0093.
[30] Council of European Union. Proposal for a directive of the european parliament and of the council
establishing the european electronic communications code (recast) com/2016/0590 final - 2016/0288
(cod).
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0590.
[31] Council of European Union. Proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council
concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communi-
cations and repealing directive 2002/58/ec (regulation on privacy and electronic communications)
com/2017/010 final - 2017/03 (cod).
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0010.
[32] Council of European Union. Regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council
of 27 april 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing directive 95/46/ec (general data protection
regulation) (text with eea relevance).
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32016R0679.
[33] S. Santesson, M. Nystrom, and T. Polk. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Qualified Cer-
tificates Profile. RFC 3739 (Proposed Standard), March 2004.
Page 26 of 30
[34] S. Weiler and D. Blacka. Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNS Security (DNSSEC).
RFC 6840 (Proposed Standard), February 2013.
[35] P. Yee. Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revo-
cation List (CRL) Profile. RFC 6818 (Proposed Standard), January 2013.
Page 27 of 30
Page 28 of 30
  
 
  
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this 
service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by 
contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see https://europa.eu/european-
union/contact_en). 
K
J-N
A
-2
9
6
7
4
-E
N
-N
 
doi:10.2760/166203 
ISBN 978-92-76-00256-7 
